Hírolvasó
Betegadatokhoz is hozzáfértek a támadók
Újabb kibertámadás érte az Európai Bizottságot
VU#655822: Kyverno is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF)
Kyverno, versions 1.16.0 to present, contains an SSRF vulnerability in its CEL-based HTTP functions, which lack URL validation or namespace scoping and allow namespaced policies to trigger arbitrary internal HTTP requests. An attacker with only namespace-level permissions can exploit this to access sensitive internal services via the highly privileged Kyverno admission controller.
DescriptionKyverno is an open-source, Kubernetes-native policy engine that functions as a dynamic admission controller for the Kubernetes API. It is designed to manage the lifecycle of cluster resources by validating, mutating, and generating configurations based on YAML-defined policies. Within a security context, the engine is frequently utilized to enforce Pod Security Standards, verify image signatures via Cosign, and audit resource configurations for compliance. Because Kyverno operates with high-level permissions to intercept and modify API requests, it represents a critical component of the cluster's security posture and trust boundary.
A server-side request forgery vulnerability exists in Kyverno’s CEL-based HTTP functions (Get and Post) used by namespaced policy types in the policies.kyverno.io API group. Unlike Kyverno’s resource library, which enforces namespace boundaries, the HTTP library at pkg/cel/libs/http/http.go performs no URL validation or scoping; i.e., there are no blocklists, namespace restrictions, or destination checks. As a result, these policies can issue arbitrary HTTP requests from the Kyverno admission controller pod.
ImpactAn authenticated attacker with only namespace-scoped permissions can create a malicious namespaced policy that sends an internal http.Get() request, captures the response in a CEL variable, and exfiltrates it via the policy’s messageExpression field returned in the admission denial. Because requests originate from the Kyverno admission controller, which often has privileged network reachability across internal cluster services and cloud metadata APIs, this enables cross-namespace data access and potential exposure of sensitive metadata or service responses, effectively breaking Kyverno’s intended security boundaries through SSRF.
SolutionUnfortunately, we were unable to reach the vendor to coordinate this vulnerability. Since a patch is unavailable, we can only offer mitigation strategies.
Mitigation should include implementing strict URL validation and destination controls within Kyverno’s CEL HTTP library to ensure parity with the namespace-scoped restrictions enforced by the resource library. Recommended safeguards include blocking access to link-local and cloud metadata address ranges, limiting outbound requests to approved in-cluster services, and providing administrators with configurable allowlists. Additionally, applying default deny network policies to the Kyverno admission controller pod can reduce residual risk by preventing unauthorized egress in the event of future validation gaps.
AcknowledgementsThanks to Igor Stepansky from Orca Security Research Pod for responsibly disclosing this vulnerability. This document was written by Dr. Elke Drennan, CISSP.
VU#221883: CrewAI contains multiple vulnerabilities including SSRF, RCE and local file read
Four vulnerabilities have been identified in CrewAI, including remote code execution (RCE), arbitrary local file read, and server-side request forgery (SSRF). CVE-2026-2275 is directly caused by the Code Interpreter Tool. The other three vulnerabilities result from improper default configuration settings within the main CrewAI agent and associated Docker images. An attacker who can interact with a CrewAI agent that has the Code Interpreter Tool enabled may exploit these issues through prompt injection, ultimately chaining the vulnerabilities together. The vendor has provided a statement addressing some, but not all, of the reported vulnerabilities.
DescriptionCrewAI is a tool for building and orchestrating multi-agent AI systems. These agents are intended to work together to complete tasks, and developers define those tasks and workflows. CrewAI supports various tools, including one called the "Code Interpreter Tool", intended for execution of Python code within a secure Docker container.
CVE-2026-2275 origintate from the Code Interpreter tool itself. The remaining vulnerabilities stem from insecure fallback behaviors and configuration issues in the CrewAI agent and Docker environment. Exploitation of CVE-2026-2275 may enable attackers to trigger the additional vulnerabilities.
The vulnerabilities are listed below:
CVE-2026-2275 The CrewAI CodeInterpreter tool falls back to SandboxPython when it cannot reach Docker, which can enable code execution through arbitrary C function calls. This vulnerability can be triggered if: allow_code_execution=True is enabled in the agent configuration, or if the Code Interpreter Tool is manually added to the agent by the developer.
CVE-2026-2286 CrewAI contains a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability that enables content acquisition from internal and cloud services, facilitated by the RAG search tools not properly validating URLs provided at runtime.
CVE-2026-2287 CrewAI does not properly check that Docker is still running during runtime, and will fall back to a sandbox setting that allows for RCE exploitation.
CVE-2026-2285 CrewAI contains a arbitrary local file read vulnerability in the JSON loader tool that reads files without path validation, enabling access to files on the server.
CVE-2026-2275 can be triggered if 'allow_code_execution=True' is enabled in the agent settings or the tool is manually added to the agent by the creator.
ImpactAn attacker with the ability to influence a CrewAI agent using the Code Interpreter Tool through either direct or indirect prompt injection can use the four vulnerabilities discovered to perform arbitrary file read, RCE, and server side request forgery. The results of the attacks can vary, as the attacker will achieve sandbox bypass and RCE/file read if the host machine is using Docker, or full RCE if the host machine is in configuration mode or unsafe mode. An attacker can use the arbitrary file read and SSRF vulnerabilities to perform credential theft, or the RCE vulnerabilities to perform further leveraging of the compromised device.
SolutionDuring coordinated disclosure, the vendor provided a statement addressing CVE-2026-2275 and CVE-2026-2287.
The vendor has indicated plans to take the following actions to improve security of CrewAI framework:
- Add ctypes and related modules to BLOCKED_MODULES in an upcoming release
- Evaluate configuration changes to fail closed rather than fall back to sandbox mode
- Provide clearer runtime warnings when sandbox mode is active
- Improve security-related documentation
At the time of writing, no complete patch is available for all disclosed vulnerabilities. Until fixes are released, users should:
- Remove or restrict or disable the Code Interpreter Tool wherever possible
- Remove (or avoid) enabling allow_code_execution=True setting unless absolutely necessary
- Limit the agent exposure to untrusted input or santiize input as appropriate
- Monitor Docker availability and prevent fallback to insecure sandbox modes
Thanks to the reporter, Yarden Porat of Cyata. This document was written by Christopher Cullen.
Zárolt képernyőn sürgeti frissítésre felhasználóit az Apple
Kritikus sebezhetőség fenyegeti a Windchill és FlexPLM rendszereket
Önéletrajznak álcázott fájlokkal telepítenek kriptobányász kártevőt egy új adathalász kampányban
Ellátásilánc-támadás érte a LiteLLM-et
Az OpenAI elindítja a ChatGPT Library szolgáltatást
A támadók továbbra is célozzák a MS-SQL rendszereket
VU#330121: IDrive for Windows contains local privilege escalation vulnerability
The IDrive Cloud Backup Client for Windows, versions 7.0.0.63 and earlier, contains a privilege escalation vulnerability that allows any authenticated user to run arbitrary executables with NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM permissions.
DescriptionIDrive is a cloud backup service that allows users to encrypt, sync, and store data from multiple devices such as PCs, Macs, iPhones, and Androids in one cloud-based account. IDrive provides a Windows client for both desktop and server editions, which acts as both a thick client and a thin client with a web interface to manage cloud backups.
CVE-2026-1995 The IDrive Windows client utility id_service.exe runs as a process with elevated SYSTEM privileges and regularly reads from several files located under C:\ProgramData\IDrive. The UTF16-LE encoded contents of these files are used by the service as arguments for starting processes. Because of weak permission configurations, these files can be edited by any standard user logged into the system. An authenticated, low-privilege attacker can overwrite or add a new file that specifies a path to an arbitrary script or .exe, which will then be executed by the id_service.exe process with SYSTEM privileges.
ImpactThis vulnerability enables an authenticated local user, or any user with access to the affected directory, to execute arbitrary code as SYSTEM on the target Windows device. A local attacker could exploit this vulnerability to escalate privileges and gain full control over the target machine, potentially enabling data theft, system modification, or arbitrary script execution.
SolutionIDrive has reported that a patch for this vulnerability is currently in development. Users should monitor IDrive releases and update their software to the latest version as soon as it becomes available. In the meantime, users are advised to restrict write permissions for the affected directory and employ additional controls such as EDR monitoring and Group Policies to detect and prevent unauthorized file modifications.
AcknowledgementsThanks to Matthew Owens and FRSecure for discovering and reporting this vulnerability. This document was written by Molly Jaconski.
VU#577436: Hard coded credentials vulnerability in GoHarbor's Harbor
GoHarbor's Harbor default admin password presents a security risk because it does not require change upon initial deployment.
DescriptionGoHarbor's Harbor is an open-source OCI-compliant container registry project that stores, signs, and manages container images. Harbor initializes with a default administrator account (admin) and password (Harbor12345), configured through the harbor_admin_password parameter in the harbor.yml. While operators are expected to change these credentials during or after deployment, Harbor does not enforce a password change during setup or upon first login. If the default credentials remain unchanged, a remote attacker can authenticate using the publicly known password to gain full administrative access.
ImpactAn attacker who gains administrative access can fully compromise the Harbor registry and all managed artifacts. This includes the ability to overwrite or inject malicious container images, enabling supply-chain attacks that may lead to remote code execution in downstream continuous integration and continuous development (CI/CD) pipelines and Kubernetes environments. The attacker can establish persistent access by creating new users, robot accounts, or API tokens, and can weaken or disable security controls such as vulnerability scanning, signature enforcement, and role-based access controls. Additionally, sensitive images can be exfiltrated by configuring replication to external registries or downloading artifacts directly. Administrative privileges also allow destructive actions such as deleting repositories or corrupting artifacts, resulting in service disruption and loss of system integrity.
SolutionOperators should change the default administrative password either before or immediately after deployment. This can be done through the Harbor web interface or by specifying a unique value for harbor_admin_password in harbor.yml during installation. A fix has been proposed to address the hardcoded default password by removing or randomizing default credentials during installation. See the Harbor pull request: https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/19188https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/pull/19188
AcknowledgementsThanks to notnotnotveg (notnotnotveg@gmail.com) who reported this vulnerability. This document was written by Michael Bragg.
